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disastrous issues in those particular cases must be shown by closely tracing out circumstances and
occurrences. Then it will appear how far such forms or measures are to be condemned, a point which it is
very necessary to show, for a total condemnation would be inconsistent with truth.
It has been already said that when a circumstantial detail of facts is impossible, the demonstrative power
which is deficient may to a certain extent be supplied by the number of cases quoted; but this is a very
dangerous method of getting out of the difficulty, and one which has been much abused. Instead of one
well-explained example, three or four are just touched upon, and thus a show is made of strong evidence. But
there are matters where a whole dozen of cases brought forward would prove nothing, if, for instance, they
are facts of frequent occurrence, and therefore a dozen other cases with an opposite result might just as easily
be brought forward. If any one will instance a dozen lost battles in which the side beaten attacked in separate
converging columns, we can instance a dozen that have been gained in which the same order was adopted. It
is evident that in this way no result is to be obtained.
Upon carefully considering these different points, it will be seen how easily examples may be misapplied.
An occurrence which, instead of being carefully analysed in all its parts, is superficially noticed, is like an
object seen at a great distance, presenting the same appearance on each side, and in which the details of its
parts cannot be distinguished. Such examples have, in reality, served to support the most contradictory
opinions. To some Daun's campaigns are models of prudence and skill. To others, they are nothing but
examples of timidity and want of resolution. Buonaparte's passage across the Noric Alps in 1797 may be
made to appear the noblest resolution, but also as an act of sheer temerity. His strategic defeat in 1812 may be
represented as the consequence either of an excess, or of a deficiency, of energy. All these opinions have
been broached, and it is easy to see that they might very well arise, because each person takes a different
view of the connection of events. At the same time these antagonistic opinions cannot be reconciled with
each other, and therefore one of the two must be wrong.
Much as we are obliged to the worthy Feuquieres for the numerous examples introduced in his
memoirs--partly because a number of historical incidents have thus been preserved which might otherwise
have been lost, and partly because he was one of the first to bring theoretical, that is, abstract, ideas into
connection with the practical in war, in so far that the cases brought forward may be regarded as intended to
exemplify and confirm what is theoretically asserted--yet, in the opinion of an impartial reader, he will
hardly be allowed to have attained the object he proposed to himself, that of proving theoretical principles by
historical examples. For although he sometimes relates occurrences with great minuteness, still he falls short
very often of showing that the deductions drawn necessarily proceed from the inner relations of these events.
Another evil which comes from the superficial notice of historical events, is that some readers are either
wholly ignorant of the events, or cannot call them to remembrance sufficiently to be able to grasp the author's
meaning, so that there is no alternative between either accepting blindly what is said, or remaining
unconvinced.
It is extremely difficult to put together or unfold historical events before the eyes of a reader in such a way as
is necessary, in order to be able to use them as proofs; for the writer very often wants the means, and can
CHAPTER VI. ON EXAMPLES 83
On War
neither afford the time nor the requisite space; but we maintain that, when the object is to establish a new or
doubtful opinion, one single example, thoroughly analysed, is far more instructive than ten which are
superficially treated. The great mischief of these superficial representations is not that the writer puts his story
forward as a proof when it has only a false title, but that he has not made himself properly acquainted with
the subject, and that from this sort of slovenly, shallow treatment of history, a hundred false views and
attempts at the construction of theories arise, which would never have made their appearance if the writer had
looked upon it as his duty to deduce from the strict connection of events everything new which he brought to
market, and sought to prove from history.
When we are convinced of these difficulties in the use of historical examples, and at the same time of the
necessity (of making use of such examples), then we shall also come to the conclusion that the latest military
history is naturally the best field from which to draw them, inasmuch as it alone is sufficiently authentic and
detailed.
In ancient times, circumstances connected with War, as well as the method of carrying it on, were different;
therefore its events are of less use to us either theoretically or practically; in addition to which, military
history, like every other, naturally loses in the course of time a number of small traits and lineaments
originally to be seen, loses in colour and life, like a worn-out or darkened picture; so that perhaps at last only
the large masses and leading features remain, which thus acquire undue proportions.
If we look at the present state of warfare, we should say that the Wars since that of the Austrian succession
are almost the only ones which, at least as far as armament, have still a considerable similarity to the present,
and which, notwithstanding the many important changes which have taken place both great and small, are
still capable of affording much instruction. It is quite otherwise with the War of the Spanish succession, as
the use of fire-arms had not then so far advanced towards perfection, and cavalry still continued the most
important arm. The farther we go back, the less useful becomes military history, as it gets so much the more
meagre and barren of detail. The most useless of all is that of the old world.
But this uselessness is not altogether absolute, it relates only to those subjects which depend on a knowledge
of minute details, or on those things in which the method of conducting war has changed. Although we know
very little about the tactics in the battles between the Swiss and the Austrians, the Burgundians and French,
still we find in them unmistakable evidence that they were the first in which the superiority of a good infantry
over the best cavalry was, displayed. A general glance at the time of the Condottieri teaches us how the whole
method of conducting War is dependent on the instrument used; for at no period have the forces used in War
had so much the characteristics of a special instrument, and been a class so totally distinct from the rest of the
national community. The memorable way in which the Romans in the second Punic War attacked the
Carthaginan possessions in Spain and Africa, while Hannibal still maintained himself in Italy, is a most
instructive subject to study, as the general relations of the States and Armies concerned in this indirect act of
defence are sufficiently well known.
But the more things descend into particulars and deviate in character from the most general relations, the less
we can look for examples and lessons of experience from very remote periods, for we have neither the means
of judging properly of corresponding events, nor can we apply them to our completely different method of
War.
Unfortunately, however, it has always been the fashion with historical writers to talk about ancient times. We
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